The average peak-hour vehicle in Dhaka travels at less than 7 kilometres per hour. A

pedestrian walking briskly is faster. This is not a recent development: the World Bank

documented the decline from 21 km/h in 2004, but the trajectory has not reversed. Every

year that passes without functioning mass rapid transit adds another cohort of commuters

to a road network that cannot absorb them.

The economic arithmetic is brutal. The Accident Research Institute at BUET estimates that

Dhaka's congestion consumed Tk 56,000 crore -- approximately $6.5 billion -- in economic

losses in 2020 alone, up from $4.35 billion in 2018. The World Bank calculates 3.2

million working hours lost every day in the city. At Bangladesh's average wage, that

is a recurring daily tax on productivity with no corresponding service received.

Thirteen Years and No Buses: The BRT Line 3 Autopsy

Bangladesh's first bus rapid transit project launched in 2012 with an approved budget of

Tk 2,039.84 crore and a target completion date of December 2016. By May 2025, Tk 2,800

crore had been spent, 77 percent of physical work was nominally complete, and not a

single revenue passenger had boarded a BRT bus.

The project's problems were never just financial. The dedicated bus lanes -- the

core feature that makes BRT function -- were incompatible with the road's actual geometry

at multiple junctions. Corridor design conflicts were flagged in successive reviews but

not resolved. The Roads and Highways Department (RHD) submitted a fourth revision in

mid-2025 seeking a further Tk 3,760 crore and a four-year extension to 2029.

The ECNEC rejected it on July 27, 2025. Planning Adviser Wahiduddin Mahmud called the

project "a monstrous and unplanned mega-project" and ordered an investigation. The

practical consequence: the interim government has effectively abandoned it, while the

partially built infrastructure -- stations, depots, partial lane markings -- sits idle

on one of Dhaka's most congested corridors.

The BNP government under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, which assumed office in February

2026, has not announced a formal position on the project's future. Transport Minister

Shaikh Rabiul Alam's public statements have not addressed BRT Line 3 specifically. The

probe committee's findings, when published, will determine whether Tk 2,800 crore of

sunk cost can be converted into any functional transit infrastructure or whether it is

a write-off.

MRT: One Line Running, Four Years of Delays on the Next

MRT Line 6 (Uttara to Motijheel, 20.1 km) is operational and carrying passengers.

It opened in stages: Uttara to Agargaon in December 2022, and the Agargaon to Motijheel

extension in December 2023. For commuters in that corridor, it represents a genuine

service improvement.

Every other MRT line in Dhaka's network plan is behind schedule.

MRT Line 1 -- the underground corridor from Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport to

Kamalapur (31.24 km, of which 19.87 km underground) -- was designed to open in December

1. DMTCL officials confirmed in 2025 that this deadline is not achievable; the revised

target is December 2030, a four-year slip. The delay is structural: as of November 2024,

depot land development was only 75 percent complete and main civil tenders had not yet

been awarded. A project that requires years of underground tunnelling in a dense urban

environment cannot recover four years of schedule slip by accelerating construction.

MRT Line 5 Northern Route (Hemayetpur to Bhatara, 20 km) broke ground in November 2023

and is targeting 2028 completion, funded primarily by JICA. MRT Line 5 Southern Route

(Gabtoli to Dasherkandi, 17.4 km) has completed its feasibility and design phase with

ADB support and is awaiting investment-project approval.

The network as planned would give Dhaka meaningful mass transit coverage. The network

as being built is running four to five years behind the plan on every line except Line 6.

The Road Safety Emergency

Dhaka's congestion is visible and measured in hours lost. Road deaths are less visible but

far larger in scale. The WHO Global Status Report on Road Safety 2023 estimates approximately

31,578 road crash deaths annually across Bangladesh -- nearly six times the 5,024 deaths

BRTA recorded in 2023 from police reports. The Jatri Kalyan Samity, using hospital and

field monitoring, reported 8,543 killed in 2024, still less than one-third of the WHO figure.

The gap is not statistical noise. Deaths that occur hours after a crash, outside police

coverage, or on roads where no report is filed are systematically excluded from BRTA counts.

The undercount is a policy problem: it allows road safety to be treated as a manageable

problem when the actual toll places Bangladesh among the world's most dangerous road

environments per capita.

Minister Rabiul Alam has announced a driver training programme and the creation of a

National Crash Database -- a genuine improvement if implemented. But neither addresses

the two structural causes: a vehicle fleet growing faster than infrastructure, and a

prosecution rate for traffic violations that is not a credible deterrent.

The Governance Gap That No Minister Can Fill Alone

Bangladesh's national vehicle fleet reached approximately 5.75 million registered vehicles

nationally (per Jatiya Sangsad records, 2023), with Dhaka accounting for roughly 40-45

percent of registrations. Every newly registered vehicle joins a road network that has

not expanded commensurably.

Five agencies govern pieces of Dhaka's transport system without a unified authority. DTCA

coordinates in name but lacks enforcement power. BRTA registers vehicles and licenses

drivers. RHD controls national highways running through the city. RAJUK plans land use

without transport-integrated zoning. DMTCL operates and builds MRT lines with no

formal interface to the bus or rickshaw networks that millions of Dhaka residents depend on.

This fragmentation produced BRT Line 3: a project approved by one body, designed by

another, revised repeatedly by a third, and finally rejected by a fourth -- with no single

authority able to cancel it at year three when the design flaws first surfaced. It will

produce the next such failure unless governance reform precedes the next project approval.

What the BNP Government Has Not Yet Done

Minister Rabiul Alam holds the largest transport portfolio in Bangladeshi history --

Road Transport, Bridges, Railways, and Shipping in a single ministry. The consolidation

creates the possibility of coordinated policymaking across modes. What has not yet appeared

is a published urban mobility policy for Dhaka: one that addresses the BRT legacy,

sets accountability targets for MRT Line 1, integrates the bus network with MRT Line 6,

and assigns DTCA the enforcement authority it currently lacks.

The city that moves at 7 km/h during peak hours cannot become a productive capital city

through infrastructure investment alone. The institutions that plan, fund, approve, and

operate transport projects need structural reform before the next large project is approved.

The BRT Line 3 file is a 13-year, Tk 2,800 crore argument for that reform.