Bibiyana Past Peak: Managing Bangladesh's Falling Domestic Gas Toward a Planned Transition

Diagnosis

The curated assessment is blunt: Bibiyana is past peak, and the national reserve-to-production ratio is declining. Bibiyana has long been the workhorse of domestic supply, so once it tips into decline the country loses its single largest cushion against import dependence. A falling reserve-to-production ratio is not a forecast of a distant problem, it is a measurement that the depletion clock is already running: each year of production removes gas that the current discovery and appraisal pace is not replacing.

This matters now because the lag between deciding to act and seeing new molecules is long. Appraisal, development drilling, and import infrastructure all take years, while the decline is continuous. If Bangladesh waits for a visible shortfall before acting, it will be managing a crisis with import spot purchases at whatever price the market sets, rather than managing a transition on its own schedule. The lead body, the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources (MoPEMR), confirmed in the GovTwin entity registry, owns this sequencing problem.

Recommended actions

1. Front-load appraisal and workover drilling on the existing producing fields. Owner: MoPEMR, directing Petrobangla and its exploration arm. Mechanism: a ring-fenced gas development budget line and an accelerated drilling programme targeting proven and near-field structures first, where geological risk is lowest. Observable signal: a measurable slowing in the rate of decline of the reserve-to-production ratio, and new appraisal wells spudded against an annual target.
2. Reallocate scarce domestic gas to its highest-value uses by sector. Owner: MoPEMR, with Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) setting the tariff structure. Mechanism: a published merit order that prioritises feedstock and high-efficiency power generation over low-efficiency uses, enforced through differentiated tariffs and supply contracts. Observable signal: gas consumption shifting toward priority sectors, and BERC tariff orders that reflect scarcity rather than legacy subsidies.
3. Build a credible LNG-plus-renewables bridge so imports fill the gap on plan, not in panic. Owner: MoPEMR, with Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and Power Grid Company of Bangladesh (PGCB) on the power side, and Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA) on the renewable build. Mechanism: term LNG contracts (not spot-only exposure) paired with a SREDA-led renewable procurement programme that reduces the volume of gas the power fleet must consume. Observable signal: a rising share of firm contracted supply versus spot purchases, and renewable capacity additions tracked by SREDA against target.
4. Reduce avoidable gas demand through efficiency and loss reduction. Owner: MoPEMR, with BERC oversight. Mechanism: metering, system-loss reduction targets, and efficiency standards for the largest industrial consumers, written into supply agreements. Observable signal: a falling ratio of system losses to gas delivered, freeing supply without a single new well.
5. Establish a single public depletion dashboard. Owner: MoPEMR. Mechanism: a quarterly reserve-to-production and supply-demand report that BERC, BPDB, PGCB, and SREDA all plan against. Observable signal: the four supporting bodies citing the same numbers in their own planning documents.

Sequencing (first 12 months)

Start with what is fastest and lowest-risk: appraisal and workover drilling on known structures, and loss reduction. These slow the decline while bigger commitments are arranged. In parallel, MoPEMR and BERC should publish the merit order and the depletion dashboard, because every later decision (who gets gas, how much LNG to contract, how fast SREDA must build) depends on a shared, honest picture of supply. Term LNG negotiation and the SREDA renewable programme are the longer-lead items; launching them in year one is what unlocks an orderly bridge rather than a forced one later.

Risks and constraints

The binding constraint is fiscal and political. Term LNG and accelerated drilling both demand capital up front against a benefit that arrives later, and scarcity-reflecting tariffs are politically costly because they raise prices for connected consumers. The temptation is to defer, lean on spot imports, and let the next administration absorb the shortfall. That choice trades a manageable transition cost today for a larger, less controllable bill tomorrow. Coordination is the second constraint: with BERC, BPDB, PGCB, and SREDA all dependent on MoPEMR's call, fragmented planning will waste the lead time that still exists.

Bottom line

Bibiyana is past peak and the reserve-to-production ratio is falling, so the question is no longer whether domestic gas declines but whether MoPEMR manages that decline on a plan or absorbs it as a crisis. Act now on appraisal, reallocation, and a contracted import-plus-renewables bridge, because every quarter of delay converts a controllable transition into a forced one.