Chapter 1

Migration Landscape

Bangladesh sustains one of the world's largest labor migration programs, with an estimated 13,000,000 workers currently abroad across more than 160 countries. Annual departures reached 1,076,000 in calendar year 2025, up 11.27 percent year-on-year (BMET, January 2026), and the July to February period of FY2025-26 logged over one million departures, a further 15 percent increase over the same period the prior year. Since 1976, BMET has registered 14,500,000 workers cumulatively, a figure that understates total migration because undocumented flows and female migrants via informal channels are not fully captured. Demographic pressure remains structural: roughly two million young people enter the labor market annually, and the domestic economy cannot absorb this cohort into formal employment at adequate wages.

The destination map is heavily Saudi-centric and Gulf-concentrated. In CY2025, Saudi Arabia absorbed 750,967 workers, nearly 70 percent of all departures (BMET). Qatar followed with 107,397, Singapore with 70,004, Kuwait with 42,657, and the Maldives with 39,970. The Gulf states collectively, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain, accounted for roughly 86 percent of FY25 departures (The Business Standard, citing BMET FY25 data). Malaysia, once the second-largest destination and previously representing 27 percent of flows, has declined sharply to around 9 percent of departures after its labor market effectively closed for nearly two years following the G2G suspension. The escalating Middle East conflict in early 2026 briefly disrupted departures: in the first ten days of March 2026, only 21,122 workers secured clearance versus 46,744 in the same period the previous year. The stock-level Gulf concentration of 71.0% represents a structural vulnerability to nationalization programs (Saudization, Emiratization) and geopolitical shocks.

Deployment trends exhibit cyclical patterns driven by Gulf construction booms, oil prices, and global disruptions. COVID-19 caused departures to fall to roughly 217,000 in 2020, triggering mass repatriations. Recovery has been robust but uneven: aggregate numbers recovered strongly by 2022-23 (peaking at 1,305,453 in CY2023 per BMET), though the cost and complexity of migration have risen concurrently, with workers reporting longer processing times, higher recruitment fees, and more restrictive employer visa regimes under the kafala sponsorship system.

Chapter 2

Remittance Economy

Formal remittance inflows reached $23.91 billion in FY2023-24 (Bangladesh Bank Annual Report), representing 5.5 percent of GDP and Bangladesh's second-largest source of foreign exchange after ready-made garments. These flows finance over 30 percent of the import bill, exceed foreign direct investment by a factor of roughly 8 to 1, and reach households across all 64 districts directly, funding consumption, education, healthcare, and small-scale investment. The momentum has accelerated: January to November 2025 saw $29.6 billion in formal inflows (The Business Standard), and March 2026 set an all-time monthly record of $3.75 billion (The Daily Star), driven partly by the BNP government's maintenance of the 2.5 percent cash incentive on formal transfers and a narrowing gap between official and market exchange rates.

Corridor Composition

Saudi Arabia and the UAE together contribute nearly 40 percent of formal remittance flows, with the broader Gulf cluster at roughly 65 percent. However, the shift toward Malaysia's closure and the relative growth of Singapore, the UK, and the US corridors is beginning to lift the per-worker remittance value, because higher-tenure, higher-wage migrants in OECD destinations send larger average transactions through formal bank channels. As the corridor mix diversifies, Bangladesh stands to gain in formal channel compliance and per capita remittance, provided fiscal incentives and exchange rate management support this shift.

The Hundi Problem

An estimated 32.0 percent of actual diaspora transfers, approximately $7.65 billion, flow through informal hundi and hawala networks, bringing total estimated flows to $31.6 billion. The persistence of hundi despite Bangladesh Bank's 2.5 percent cash incentive reflects structural advantages that policy incentives alone cannot overcome: same-day settlement versus 1-3 days for banks, zero documentation requirements, door-to-door delivery in rural areas, and embedded trust networks within migrant communities. The real exchange rate premium available through informal channels has narrowed since the 2022-24 taka depreciation managed by Bangladesh Bank reduced the kerb-rate differential, which is the proximate driver of the recent formal channel surge.

The average cost of sending $200 to Bangladesh stands at 4.5 percent, 1.5 percentage points above the SDG 10.7 target of 3.0 percent. This gap translates to approximately $0.36 billion in excess fees annually, a direct tax on migrant earnings that falls disproportionately on low-wage Gulf corridor workers. Reducing this cost gap to SDG target requires increased competition among money transfer operators and elimination of exclusive partnerships between banks and large transfer chains that prevent rate competition.

Chapter 3

Migration Cost and Governance

Average migration costs of $4,000 (range: $3,000 to $5,000) per worker (CPD and RMMRU surveys) place Bangladesh among the highest-cost migration corridors globally. A worker earning $4,000-6,000 annually in Saudi Arabia may spend 12-18 months repaying recruitment debt before generating net savings for the family, effectively donating the first year of overseas labor to the recruitment industry. By comparison, the Philippines' average migration cost is approximately $1,500 and India's is $2,200 (ILO estimates), both achieved through stronger regulatory frameworks and digital recruitment platforms. The BNP government has acknowledged this disparity and pledged to introduce subsidized migration loans of up to Tk 10 lakh to reduce dependence on informal moneylenders and dalals.

The Dalal System

The multi-layered sub-agent (dalal) system is the primary driver of cost inflation. Village-level brokers connect aspiring migrants to agency representatives for commissions of $1,000-2,000 per worker, operating entirely outside regulatory oversight. The 1,200 BMET-licensed recruiting agencies face limited enforcement of fee caps, and the proliferation of agencies creates a fragmented market where compliance is the exception rather than the rule. India's eMigrate platform offers a proven model for digitization-driven cost reduction: online visa verification, direct employer-worker matching, standardized service fees, and real-time tracking of the recruitment pipeline.

Recruitment Fraud

Approximately 12,000 formal complaints are filed annually against recruiting agencies, a figure that dramatically understates actual fraud given that many victims lack awareness of complaint mechanisms or fear retaliation from agencies that control their deployment pipeline. Common fraud patterns include charging for nonexistent jobs, visa trading, salary misrepresentation, and document confiscation. The Overseas Employment and Migrants Act of 2013 provides a legal framework for prosecution, but enforcement remains constrained by the political connections of agency owners and institutional capacity gaps at BMET. The BNP government's proposed agency grading system, which would classify recruiting agencies by reliability and compliance record, is a step toward accountability, though implementation timelines remain unspecified.

Chapter 4

Gender and Protection

Female migrants account for approximately 16 percent of annual departures (BMET Gender Statistics 2024), concentrated overwhelmingly in domestic work in Gulf states, Jordan, and Lebanon. This figure understates the true female migration rate because many women travel through informal channels outside BMET registration. The kafala sponsorship system, under which workers are bound to individual employers, creates acute power imbalances: isolation in private households, restricted mobility, limited access to legal remedies, and documented patterns of wage theft, physical abuse, and passport confiscation. Unlike factory or construction work, domestic work occurs in private spaces where labor inspections are not legally permitted and workers may have no contact with fellow nationals or consular support networks.

Protection Gaps

Bangladesh has oscillated between protection-through-restriction and protection-through-regulation, imposing and later lifting bans on female migration to specific destinations. Neither approach has proven effective in isolation. Bans push migration underground through irregular channels with even less protection, while regulation requires institutional capacity that BMET currently lacks. The 32 labor attaches across all missions cannot provide adequate consular protection to a diaspora of 13,000,000, and complaint mechanisms in destination countries are inaccessible to workers who do not speak the local language, understand the legal system, or have physical mobility outside the employer's premises.

Bangladesh has not ratified ILO Convention 189 (Domestic Workers Convention), which would establish minimum protections including written contracts, minimum wage coverage, limits on working hours, and access to complaint mechanisms for domestic workers. Among major labor-sending countries, only the Philippines has ratified C189, and its implementation demonstrates that ratification alone is insufficient without bilateral enforcement agreements with destination countries. The Wage Earners' Welfare Board (WEWB), established in 1990 and codified under the Wage Earners' Welfare Board Law 2016 (wewb.gov.bd), manages a corpus of roughly $450 million but focuses primarily on departure-side services and emergency repatriation rather than in-country protection.

Destination-Specific Risks

Risk profiles vary significantly by destination. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait operate strict kafala systems that tie workers to individual sponsors. The UAE has introduced partial reforms including a wage protection system and limited labor mobility, but enforcement remains inconsistent and the system structurally favors employers. Jordan and Lebanon, which host significant Bangladeshi domestic workers, have experienced documented cases of abuse and trafficking. Malaysia's plantation and manufacturing sectors, where Bangladeshi workers are concentrated, have drawn scrutiny from the US State Department's Trafficking in Persons report and have contributed to the G2G suspension that has curtailed the Malaysia corridor since 2022.

Chapter 5

Diaspora Engagement

Beyond formal remittances, the Bangladeshi diaspora holds estimated savings of $5-8 billion outside the domestic financial system. Diaspora investment of approximately $1.20 billion annually is modest relative to both the diaspora's savings capacity and the economy's investment needs. The gap reflects institutional barriers: complex property ownership regulations for non-residents, absence of diaspora-specific investment instruments, bureaucratic obstacles in business registration, and lack of a one-stop facilitation window. The BNP government's proposed district-level one-stop service centers bringing together the Probashi Kallyan Bank, BMET manpower offices, and welfare centers could lower some of these barriers on the send-side, though the regulatory environment for diaspora investment itself requires separate reform.

Diaspora Bonds

Bangladesh has never issued a properly structured diaspora bond, despite successful precedents in India ($5.5 billion through the India Development Bond and Resurgent India Bond), Israel, and Ethiopia. The Wage Earners' Development Bond (WEDB) exists but has limited uptake due to terms that compare unfavorably with informal real estate investment and kerb-rate foreign currency returns. A USD or BDT denominated diaspora bond offering 7-8 percent returns and simplified subscription through mobile banking could mobilize $2-3 billion in diaspora savings for infrastructure investment. The BNP administration has signaled openness to diaspora-specific financial instruments as part of its broader expatriate welfare agenda, though no specific bond program has been gazetted as of May 2026.

Return Migration and Brain Gain

Approximately 250,000 workers return to Bangladesh annually, carrying accumulated savings, skills, and international exposure. Bangladesh lacks a systematic reintegration framework. The Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare's April 2026 gazette mandating a central returnee database represents a foundation for tracking returnees, but skills recognition, entrepreneurship grants, and preferential credit access for migrant-returnee enterprises have not been operationalized. The Philippines' OWWA reintegration program, which channels returning workers into livelihood programs and enterprise development with subsidized credit, offers a credible model Bangladesh could adapt at lower cost given the Probashi Kallyan Bank's existing mandate.

The brain drain dimension adds complexity: 8.5 percent of tertiary-educated Bangladeshis reside abroad, predominantly in the US, UK, Canada, and Australia. This represents a net loss of domestic human capital but also a latent resource if diaspora engagement mechanisms can facilitate knowledge transfer, virtual mentorship, and investment channeling without requiring physical return. India's engagement of its Silicon Valley diaspora, which catalyzed Bangalore's IT sector, offers a model for converting brain drain into brain gain through institutional connectivity rather than physical repatriation incentives.

Policy Implications

Toward Managed, Value-Driven Migration

The analysis across five chapters reveals a migration ecosystem that is large, growing, and structurally vital to Bangladesh's economy, but also fragile in its Saudi-corridor dependence, exploitative in its cost structure, inadequate in its gender protections, and underdeveloped in its diaspora capital mobilization. The BNP government's declared migration priorities are directionally correct. The credibility test is whether they translate from ministerial pledges into funded, staffed, time-bound programs. The policy agenda falls into three tiers: immediate interventions to reduce costs and protect workers, medium-term investments in skills and corridor diversification, and long-term structural reforms to convert migration from a survival strategy into a managed development tool.

1. Reduce migration costs to regional benchmarks. Bangladesh's average cost of $4,000 is 2-3x the Philippines benchmark. Digitize recruitment using an eMigrate-style platform, eliminate dalal chains through direct employer-worker matching, enforce fee caps via mandatory escrow mechanisms, and operationalize the government's pledged Tk 10 lakh migration loan facility through Probashi Kallyan Bank. Target: $2,000 average cost within three years.
2. Formalize remittance channels. The estimated 32.0 percent informal share represents $7.65 billion in unrecorded flows. Maintain alignment of the official rate with the market rate, ensure full MFS interoperability (bKash, Nagad) with international transfer platforms, and streamline bank KYC for remittance recipients in rural areas.
3. Diversify migration corridors beyond Saudi Arabia. With 70 percent of CY2025 departures concentrated in Saudi Arabia alone, Bangladesh is structurally exposed to Saudization policy and geopolitical disruption. Reopen the Malaysia G2G channel under a reformed, transparent framework. Expand Japan (SSW), Korea (EPS), and Central European corridors through bilateral agreements and targeted language training programs.
4. Strengthen female migrant protection. At 16 percent of annual departures (with a much higher informal share), ratify ILO C189, establish female-staffed complaint hotlines in every Gulf mission, mandate pre-departure rights training, and negotiate minimum wage floors and kafala reform in bilateral labor agreements.
5. Launch diaspora bonds and investment instruments. Issue USD or BDT-denominated diaspora bonds at competitive rates (7-8 percent), establish a one-stop investment facilitation center, simplify property ownership procedures for non-residents, and create regulatory sandboxes for diaspora-founded enterprises. Move the Probashi Card from gazette to operational deployment by Q4 2026.
6. Build return-reintegration infrastructure. With 250,000 annual returnees, use the April 2026 returnee database gazette as the foundation for a Philippine OWWA-style program: skills recognition, entrepreneurship grants, preferential Probashi Kallyan Bank credit, and psychosocial support services at district one-stop centers.
7. Establish a national skills authority. Only 22.0 percent of workers deploy as skilled. A TESDA-equivalent body with internationally recognized certifications in nursing, welding, IT, and hospitality would shift workers from less-skilled to skilled categories, raising per-worker earnings 3-5x and reducing Bangladesh's competitive disadvantage relative to Philippines and Indian workers in the same corridors.